This paper demonstrates that rating-based capital requirements, through their impact on insurers' investment demand, aect corporate bond prices. Consistent with insurers' low demand for investment-grade (IG) bonds with a rating close to noninvestment-grade, these bonds are underpriced. Consistent with insurers' high (low) demand for IG bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure, these bonds are overpriced (underpriced). Insurer demand, measured by insurer holdings, explains most of these pricing eects. We identify rating-based capital requirements as the driver of insurer demand, and thus the pricing eects, by showing that the eects do not exist before these requirements' implementation in 1993.
Introduction
This paper examines whether rating-based capital requirements aect asset prices. An extensive literature shows that capital regulations impact the investment decisions of regulated rms and thus their demand for certain assets (e.g., Pennacchi (2006) , Iannotta, Pennacchi, and Santos (2018) , and Becker and Ivashina (2015) ). Recent theoretical work links investor demand to asset prices (e.g., He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Koijen and Yogo (2016) ). In particular, the model of Harris, Opp, and Opp (2017) formalizes the argument that capital regulations, through their impact on regulated rms' investment decisions, cause equilibrium asset prices to diverge from their frictionless benchmark. In this paper we provide empirical support for this argument using U.S. corporate bonds.
The U.S. corporate bond market oers an ideal setting to investigate how rating-based capital requirements aect asset prices for several reasons. First, insurers are the most important players in this market, owning more than a third of the market value outstanding (see Figure 1 ) and accounting for a large portion of trading volume (Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) ). To the extent that insurers are the marginal investors in corporate bonds, the impact of their investment decisions on prices is likely to be substantial.
Second, insurers' rating-based capital requirements create incentives to invest in corporate bonds with certain characteristics (Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011) and Becker and Ivashina (2015) ). These incentives lead to specic predictions about patterns in bond prices that are attributable to insurers' capital regulations.
We develop two bond pricing hypotheses based on well-documented eects of ratingbased capital requirements on insurers' investment incentives. The rst hypothesis derives from the literature's empirical nding that high capital charges for non-investment-grade (NIG) bonds encourage insurers to quickly sell bonds downgraded from IG to NIG, which results in short-lived underpricing of these bonds (Ellul et al. (2011) and Ambrose, Cai, and Helwege (2008) ). We argue that insurers, aware of the potential impact of these re sales, preemptively avoid investing in IG bonds with a rating close to NIG, resulting in low demand for such bonds. Thus, our rst hypothesis is that as a result of low demand, bonds with high NIG proximity (IG bonds with a rating close to NIG) are underpriced. 1 1 Throughout this paper, the terms underpriced and overpriced should be understood as relative to a frictionless benchmark equilibrium and the mispricing we document should be viewed as reecting a new equilibrium resulting from regulatory capital constraints. Black (1972) , Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) , and Harris et al. (2017) develop equilibrium models in which leverage constraints cause equilibrium prices to diverge from their frictionless benchmark.
and Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Wang (2015) ).
We next test the hypothesis that the detected pricing patterns are a manifestation of insurer investment demand. First, we examine whether insurers do indeed tilt their portfolios away from bonds with a rating close to NIG and towards (away from) bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure. As predicted, regression and portfolio analyses demonstrate that insurers underweight bonds rated BBB− and overweight (underweight) bonds with high (low) exposure to both bond market risk and systematic term risk. We then investigate the extent to which this investment demand explains the observed pricing patterns. Our tests indicate that insurer holdings explain most of the mispricing associated with NIG proximity and systematic risk exposure. Taken together, these results strongly support our hypothesis that the outperformance of bonds with high NIG proximity and underperformance (outperformance) of bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure are driven by insurer investment demand.
Finally, we examine the hypothesis that rating-based capital requirements are the driver of the observed patterns in insurer investment demand and therefore are ultimately responsible for the documented pricing patterns. Rating-based capital requirements for insurers are implemented in 1993. Consistent with our hypothesis, the same tests that provide strong evidence of pricing patterns during the 1993-2014 period fail to detect any such patterns during 1978-1992. Examining both periods together, our results indicate that the risk-adjusted
performance of the portfolios we analyze is signicantly dierent during the period in which capital requirements are in place.
In sum, our results show that insurer investment demand induced by rating-based capital requirements has a substantial impact on the equilibrium prices of corporate bonds. This nding adds to recent work on the implications of insurer investment demand for the U.S. corporate bond market. Ellul et al. (2011) examine 1,179 bonds downgraded from IG to NIG between 2001 and 2005 and demonstrate that re sales by insurers around these downgrades cause short-lived deviations of market prices from fundamental values. In contrast, our paper shows that insurers' persistent aversion to high-NIG proximity bonds not yet downgraded to NIG causes equilibrium prices to diverge from their frictionless benchmark. Becker and Ivashina (2015) analyze 600 IG bonds issued between 2004 and 2007, and nd that large primary market purchases by insurers are related to poor bond performance immediately after issuance. We expand on this nding by showing that insurers' demand aects prices long after issuance and that this eect is driven by insurers' demand for high-systematic risk exposure bonds. Another important distinction between these previous studies and ours is that we demonstrate that insurers' demand aects the prices of a large cross-section and long time-series of IG corporate bonds we examine more than 20,000 unique bonds over the entire 1993-2014 period when rating-based capital requirements for insurers are in eect. This is important because persistent distortions in a large cross-section of bond prices has ramications for the cost of capital of many rms, which may cause deviations from optimal aggregate investment (Stein (1996) , Chirinko and Schaller (2001) , Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) , Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) , Polk and Sapienza (2009), Harford, Martos-Vila, and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) , Warusawitharana and Whited (2016) , and Van Binsbergen and Opp (2017) ). Finally, we extend prior work by providing evidence linking the pricing eects we document to capital regulations: the eects are non-existent prior to the implementation of rating-based capital requirements.
Our work also contributes to three broader strands of the literature. First, we add to a growing number of studies on the unintended consequences of regulatory reliance on credit ratings. Pennacchi (2006) and Iannotta et al. (2018) develop theoretical models to demonstrate that rating-based capital requirements create incentives for regulated rms to increase their systematic risk exposure, thus making these rms more likely to suer losses during an economic downturn and undermining the goal of prudential regulations. Acharya and Richardson (2009) , Calomiris and Mason (2010) , White (2010) , Stanton and Wallace (2018) , Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) , and Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2017) provide empirical evidence that ratings-based capital requirements lead to various forms of regulatory arbitrage by nancial rms, which may leave these rms undercapitalized and pose a threat to the stability of the nancial sector. The use of ratings in nancial regulations also aects the allocation of credit among industrial rms (Becker and Ivashina (2015) ) and these rms' cost of capital (Kisgen and Strahan (2010) ). We document another unintended consequence of regulatory reliance on ratings: a distortion in the equilibrium prices of corporate bonds.
We then establish regulated institutions' investment demand as the channel through which this distortion takes place. Second, our paper provides empirical support to the theoretical literature on the asset pricing implications of institutional investor demand (e.g., He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Koijen and Yogo (2016) ). We focus on insurers' demand driven by rating-based capital requirements, and document that it aects equilibrium corporate bond prices. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Harris et al. (2017) that capital requirements that measure the risk of assets imperfectly cause distortions in the cross-section of asset prices. While previous empirical research has documented persistent distortions in the pricing of stocks (Gompers and Metrick (2001) ) and loans (Ivashina and Sun (2011) ) due to institutional demand, to our knowledge we are the rst to link such an eect to capital regulations.
Finally, our paper contributes to the empirical asset pricing literature by providing new evidence on the cross-section of corporate bond returns. Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel (2013) , Crawford, Perotti, Price, and Skousen (2015) , Chordia, Goyal, Nozawa, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2017) , and Choi and Kim (2018) show that anomalies previously documented in the equity market are present in the corporate bond market as well. Our study adds to this literature by demonstrating that rating-based capital requirements, which are unique to credit markets, are important for the cross-section of bond returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses insurers' guaranty funds, capital requirements, and the eect of these on insurers' investment demand. It then species our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data sources and sample construction. Section 4 presents evidence of the hypothesized patterns in bond pricing.
Section 5 establishes rating-based capital requirements, through their impact on insurer investment demand, as the driver of these pricing patterns. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background and Hypotheses
In this section we describe the investment incentives created by insurers' guaranty funds and capital requirements. Based on this discussion, we develop our hypotheses.
Insurer Guaranty Funds, Capital Requirements, and Investment Incentives
Insurer guaranty funds, established mostly during the 1970s and still in existence today, guarantee the benets of an insolvent insurer's policyholders.
3 When an insurer becomes insolvent and is unable to satisfy policyholders' claims, the claims are covered through assessments against surviving insurers operating in the same state (Munch and Smallwood (1980) ).
4 Guaranty funds structured in this manner are meant to encourage insurers to monitor their competitors and report any excessive risk-taking to state regulators. However, in many states assessments can be recovered through rate increases or tax osets (Lee et al.
(1997)), thus weakening the intended monitoring incentive. In sum, guaranty funds enable insurers to take on risk without bearing its full cost (Cummins (1988) ), thereby inducing insurers to take on more risk than they otherwise would (Lee et al. (1997) ).
3 Guaranty funds were established by states at dierent times between 1969 and 1981 (Lee et al. (1997 4 In all states except New York, guaranty funds are funded post-insolvency and assessments are a at percentage of the surviving insurers' premiums in the state (Duncan (1984) ). The New York guaranty fund is pre-funded through quarterly assessments until a certain prescribed level is reached.
Capital requirements for insurers were implemented in part to reign in the risk-taking incentives created by state guaranty funds. Early eorts to ensure that insurers had sucient equity to cover policyholders' losses took on two forms. First, acquiring a state insurance license required an initial xed dollar amount of equity capital that varied with insurer ownership form and line of business (Munch and Smallwood (1979) and Grace et al. (1998) ).
Second, to make certain that capital grew as an insurer grew, state regulators encouraged, though did not require, insurers to hold more capital as their premiums written increased (Munch and Smallwood (1979) ). Importantly, these early capital requirements did not constrain in a meaningful way insurers' leverage or the risk of insurers' investments, and thus did little to curb the incentive for insurers to take on risk.
This changed in 1993 when insurer regulators introduced risk-based capital requirements.
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Specically, regulators adopted the ratio of actual capital (i.e., total adjusted capital) to required capital (i.e., authorized control level risk-based capital), commonly referred to as the risk-based capital (RBC) ratio, as the primary measure of insurer capital adequacy. Although required capital considers a number of risk sources, the risk of the insurer's investment portfolio is one of the most important. Figure 2 shows the composition of insurers' portfolios through time. The gure indicates that insurers invest primarily in xed-income securities, and that of these, corporate bonds are the most represented asset class. As a result, the credit quality of an insurer's corporate bond holdings has a rst order impact on its RBC ratio.
For capital adequacy assessment purposes, the credit quality of corporate bonds is assessed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) Securities Valuation Oce, which assigns each security in an insurer's portfolio an NAIC designation.
6 Designations take integer values from 1 to 6 with higher numbers implying worse credit quality. The NAIC designation determines the amount of capital an insurer must hold to cover expected credit losses on a security, and as Table 1 shows, securities with higher NAIC designations have higher required capital charges.
For corporate bonds, NAIC designations are exclusively based on credit ratings issued by approved credit rating providers (CRPs).
7 Table 1 summarizes the one-to-one mapping from 5 The NAIC's Risk-Based Capital Model Act became eective in 1993.
For more details, see http://www.naic.org/documents/prod_serv_statistical_rsn_lb.pdf.
6 Although insurers are regulated at the state level, state capital regulations are coordinated through the NAIC and all states use the same NAIC designations and required capital charges (Becker and Ivashina (2015) ). Empirical studies conrm that rating-based capital requirements play an important role in insurers' decision to dispose of securities downgraded from IG to NIG. Ambrose et al. (2008) show that insurers engage in greater selling of bonds downgraded from IG to NIG than of comparable bonds that are not downgraded, and Ellul et al. (2011) provide evidence that such insurer re sales temporarily depress prices.
9 The ndings of these studies suggest that waiting to sell a bond with a worsening credit quality until after it is downgraded to NIG can be costly. This creates a strong incentive for insurers to avoid investing in IG bonds with high NIG proximity.
Investment portfolio returns are a primary source of income for insurers and essential for their ability to cover claims. Since guaranty funds allow insurers to take on risk without bearing its full cost, insurers have an incentive to increase expected returns by taking more systematic risk. Without the constraint imposed by capital requirements, insurers can increase systematic risk either by tilting their portfolios towards high-systematic risk exposure securities or by levering up their investments in low-systematic risk exposure securities.
Prior to 1993, insurers had no reason to favor one approach over the other, since early capital regulations did not limit their ability to borrow or to invest in high-systematic risk securities.
This changed with the adoption of rating-based capital requirements, which restricted insurers' borrowing but not systematic-risk taking. Since within each NAIC designation there are bonds with dierent systematic risk exposures, conditional on NAIC designation, insurers can tilt their portfolios towards (away from) bonds with higher (lower) systematic risk without increasing required capital. This incentive is formally modeled by Pennacchi (2006) and nds empirical support in Becker and Ivashina (2015) and Iannotta et al. (2018). Becker and Ivashina (2015) provide evidence from the primary market that insurers attempt to 89% of outstanding corporate bond ratings were provided by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch (https://www.sec.gov/ocr/reportspubs/annual-reports/2016-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf ). In our analysis, we focus on credit ratings by these three CRPs.
8 For securities rated by multiple CRPs, NAIC designations reect the lower rating when two are available and the second lowest rating when more than two are available.
9 Ellul et al. (2011) focus on the rst instance of a CRP downgrading a bond from IG to NIG and show that insurers begin selling such bonds up to 20 weeks prior to the downgrade. Since for regulatory capital purposes it is the second downgrade that results in a higher capital charge, the selling pressure documented
by Ellul et al. (2011) commercial banks tend to invest in syndicated loans with higher systematic risk exposure.
Hypotheses
In this paper we argue that insurers' low demand for corporate bonds with high NIG proximity and high (low) demand for corporate bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure, both induced by ratings-based capital requirements, impact equilibrium IG corporate bond prices. Insurers are the largest investors in corporate bonds, holding about a third of the total market value outstanding (Figure 1 ). Thus, insurers are likely to be the marginal investor in the IG segment of the corporate bond market. If the supply of corporate bonds is not perfectly elastic, the eect of insurers' demand on bonds' demand curves will impact equilibrium bond prices, causing highly-demanded (lowly-demanded) bonds to be relatively overpriced (underpriced). This argument is similar to that made by empirical studies of the equity and loan markets documenting that demand by important market participants has a persistent impact on prices in these markets (Shleifer (1986) , Gompers and Metrick (2001) , and Ivashina and Sun (2011)).
Our reasoning leads to four hypotheses that we test in the remainder of the paper. The rst two hypotheses, H1 and H2, relate to the pricing patterns we expect to observe as a result of insurers' low demand for IG bonds that have high NIG proximity and high (low) demand for IG bonds that have high (low) systematic risk exposure.
H1: IG bonds with high NIG proximity are, on average, underpriced.
H2: Conditional on capital charge, IG bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure are, on average, overpriced (underpriced).
Securities that are underpriced are expected to generate high risk-adjusted future returns.
Therefore, we test H1 by examining whether a portfolio of high-NIG proximity bonds generates positive risk-adjusted returns. Similarly, we test H2 by examining whether a portfolio of high-systematic (low-systematic) risk exposure bonds produce negative (positive) riskadjusted returns. For both H1 and H 2, we investigate whether the pricing eects reect long-term equilibrium prices by examining whether the eects are persistent. These tests cover the 1993-2014 period, when rating-based capital requirements are in eect.
Our next two hypotheses, H3 and H4, identify insurer demand, and ultimately ratingbased capital requirements, as the driver of the pricing eects hypothesized in H1 and H2.
H3: Insurers' low demand for IG bonds with high NIG proximity and high (low) demand for bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure drive the pricing patterns predicted by hypotheses H1 and H2.
H4: Rating-based capital requirements are the driver of insurers' low demand for IG bonds with high NIG proximity and high (low) demand for bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure.
We test H3 by examining whether the outperformance of high-NIG proximity bonds and underperformance (outperformance) of high-systematic (low-systematic) risk exposure bonds is related to insurer holdings. Finally, we test H4 by examining whether these pricing eects exist in the absence of rating-based capital requirements by repeating our tests of H1 and H2 using the 1978-1992 period, which is prior to these requirements' implementation.
Data and Sample
Before proceeding to the tests of our hypotheses, we describe our data and the construction of our sample. 11 In Section I and Tables A1-A5 of the Internet Appendix, we demonstrate that our results hold when we exclude returns based on matrix prices from our sample.
12 We calculate returns from price data instead of from DataStream's cumulative total return indices because we detect errors in these indices. The errors include negative index values (28 securities aected), decreasing index values but increasing prices (more than 4,000 securities aected), and missing index values prices.
The MNAIC database contains information on bonds acquired or disposed of by insurers from January 1994 through December 2014. We keep only records pertaining to trades, and remove records related to non-trading activity (e.g., maturity, repayment, and calls). We therefore augment TRACE Enhanced data with TRACE data from April 2014 through December 2014. TRACE data are available in real time and during this period include all trades that will eventually be distributed through TRACE Enhanced.
13 Taken 15 The monthend price is then taken to be the last available daily price from the last ve trading days of the month. We combine MNAIC and TRACE/TRACE Enhanced month-end prices into one data set, giving precedence to the latter when prices are available from both sources.
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We then use month-end prices from DataStream or from the combined TRACE/TRACE Enhanced/MNAIC data to calculate monthly returns separately for each dataset.
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The when price and accrued interest data are available (more than 3,000 securities aected).
13 We use TRACE Enhanced for the early part of the sample for two reasons. First, prior to 2005 TRACE is incomplete due to its gradual phase-in and therefore contains only a subset of the trades in TRACE Enhanced. Second, for the entire period, TRACE reports the size of all IG bond trades larger than $5 million as $5MM+ whereas TRACE Enhanced reports the actual trade size.
return of bond i in month t, r i,t , is calculated as:
where P i,t is the bond's clean price at the end of month t, AI i,t is the bond's accrued interest at the end of month t, and C i,t is the bond's coupon paid during month t. 
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Bond ratings and other characteristics come from several sources and are measured for each bond i at the end of each month t. Data on S&P, Moody's, and Fitch ratings come from
DataScope. To determine a bond's rating for regulatory capital purposes when ratings from multiple CRPs are available in the same month, we follow the insurers' regulatory capital guidance and use the lower rating when two are available and the second lowest rating when three are available (Becker and Ivashina (2015) ). These regulatory ratings are then converted to NAIC designations using the mapping in 21 In addition to the clean economic interpretation of T ERM and DEF , dening DEF as the component of CBM KT that is orthogonal to T ERM has several empirical advantages. First, since CBM KT is constructed from the bonds in our return data, our denitions of T ERM and DEF ensure that these factors span the bonds' aggregate returns. Second, our methodology does not make any assumptions about the aggregate corporate bond market's exposure to term risk.
21 Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012) , Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013), and Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2017) suggest that a liquidity factor is an important driver of corporate bond returns. In Section II and Tables A6-A9 of the Internet Appendix, we demonstrate that the pricing patterns we document persist after accounting for aggregate bond liquidity.
This contrasts with the commonly used approach of proxying for the default factor with the returns of a zero-cost long-short portfolio that is long a portfolio of corporate bonds and short a portfolio of long-maturity U.S. Treasuries (see Fama and French (1993) , Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013), Chordia et al. (2017) , Bai, Bali, and Wen (2018) , and Choi and Kim (2018)), which implicitly assumes that the term factor exposure of both the long and short portfolios is the same.
22 Indeed, our analysis suggests that the exposure of the aggregate bond market to term risk is only about 0.30 (see discussion in next paragraph). Thus, if we were to take DEF to be the dierence between CBM KT and T ERM , while T ERM and DEF would still span the aggregate returns of the bonds in our data, our DEF factor would have a strong negative (−0.70) exposure to T ERM , which would complicate the economic interpretation of our results.
23 Nonetheless, in Section III and Tables A10-A20 of the Internet Appendix, we perform several robustness tests to ensure that our results do not depend on our factor denitions. 22 If the term factor exposures of the long and short portfolios are dierent, then the zero-cost portfolio has exposure to term risk and is therefore likely to be correlated with T ERM . 23 Since both methodologies dene DEF as a linear combination of T ERM and CBM KT , the space spanned by T ERM and DEF together is the same in both cases. Thus, factor regressions that include T ERM and DEF as independent variables will produce the exact same point estimate and inferential statistics for the intercept coecient (alpha or risk-adjusted returns) in both cases. Default beta estimated from a regression of excess bond returns on T ERM and DEF will also be the same regardless of the DEF denition used, since the slope coecient on DEF measures the covariance between the bond's excess return and the component of DEF that is orthogonal to T ERM , which in both cases is simply the component of CBM KT that is orthogonal to T ERM . However, the slope coecient on T ERM from such regressions will dier for dierent denitions of DEF .
Proximity to NIG
NIG proximity is intended to capture the possibility that a bond is downgraded to NIG. Figure 3 shows that over horizons of one to 12 months, bonds rated BBB−, the worst-rated NAIC designation 2 bonds, are downgraded to NIG much more often than bonds with any other IG rating. For instance, BBB− bonds are downgraded to NIG in the following month eight times more often than BBB bonds. We therefore take bonds with a BBB− regulatory rating to be bonds with high NIG proximity.
24

Systematic Risk Exposure
We measure bonds' systematic risk exposure (beta) to the three bond factors described in Section 3.2: bond market risk, systematic term risk, and systematic default risk. The bond market beta of each bond is estimated from a regression of excess bond returns on CBM KT .
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The regression specication is:
We take the estimated slope coecient on CBM KT , β CBM KT i , as our measure of the bond's ex ante bond market beta. Term and default betas are estimated from a multivariate regression of excess bond returns on T ERM and DEF :
We take the estimated slope coecients β
T ERM i
and β DEF i as our measures of the bond's ex ante term and default factor betas, respectively. We calculate β CBM KT , β T ERM , and β DEF for each bond i at the end of each month t using a 60-month rolling window covering months t − 59 through t, inclusive. To reduce measurement error, we follow Gebhardt et al. 25 Gebhardt et al. (2005) demonstrate that betas estimated from regressions are more closely related to corporate-bond returns than bond characteristics that proxy for these betas (e.g., rating and duration).
Sample
The sample we use to test our hypotheses contains all observations in our return data for which the variables necessary to execute our tests are available. Specically, the sample constructed at the end of each month t, used to examine month t + 1 returns, contains all IG bonds with at least one year to maturity and available values of M V , β CBM KT , β T ERM , and β DEF . During the 1993-2014 period when rating-based capital requirements are in eect, the sample contains 3,405 bonds in the average month. Table 3 Table 3 . In the average month, the cross-sectional correlation between β CBM KT and β T ERM is 0.80. This high correlation is not surprising given the high correlation between CBM KT and T ERM (Table 2 ). In contrast, the correlation between β DEF and β CBM KT is much lower (0.37), and that between β DEF and β 
Bond Pricing
In this section, we test hypotheses H1 and H2, which provide predictions for patterns in bond pricing. We focus on the 1993-2014 period, during which rating-based capital requirements for insurers are in eect.
NIG Proximity and Bond Pricing
We rst test our hypothesis H1 that IG bonds with high NIG proximity are underpriced. We do so by investigating whether a portfolio of bonds rated BBB−, which we show in Section 3.3 have high NIG proximity, generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Additionally, to ensure that any mispricing we document is specic to high-NIG proximity bonds, we examine the risk-adjusted performance of portfolios of better-rated bonds, as well as that of portfolios that are long BBB− bonds and short better-rated bonds.
Specically, at the end of each month t, we form ve portfolios. The rst through fourth portfolios contain all bonds with an NAIC designation of 1 (NAIC 1), all bonds with an NAIC designation of 2 not rated BBB− (NAIC 2 No BBB−), all IG bonds not rated BBB− (IG No BBB−), and bonds rated BBB. The last portfolio contains only bonds rated BBB−.
We then calculate the M V -weighted month t + 1 excess returns for each portfolio, as well as for zero-cost long-short portfolios that are long the BBB− portfolio and short one of the other four portfolios. The result is a time-series of monthly excess returns for each portfolio, including the long-short portfolios.
To measure risk-adjusted portfolio performance we regress the time-series of excess portfolio returns on the excess returns of factor-mimicking portfolios. The regressions are of the form:
where R p,t+1 is portfolio p's post-formation excess return, F t+1 is a vector of month t + 1 factor-mimicking portfolio excess returns, and β F P ost,p is a vector of coecients measuring the post-formation exposures of the portfolio to the factors in F t+1 . The estimated intercept α p measures the risk-adjusted return (alpha) generated by the portfolio, where the riskadjustment reects expected returns under a frictionless benchmark.
A positive (negative)
alpha indicates that the portfolio outperforms (underperforms) the benchmark, meaning that the bonds in it are, on average, underpriced (overpriced). If the bonds in the portfolio are correctly priced, i.e. the portfolio's return is commensurate with its risk, then the alpha should be zero, indicating that the market's pricing of the portfolio is consistent with the frictionless benchmark.
While previous research focuses on term and default factors as the main drivers of corporate bond returns, Fama and French (1993) Monthly LIQ values are for the traded liquidity factor from Lubos Pastor's website (http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor). SM B, HM L, M OM , and LIQ are the excess returns of included in our model span the true set of factors important for pricing our sample bonds, the estimated coecient α p is an unbiased estimate of the portfolio's risk-adjusted performance. Inclusion of unimportant or redundant factors does not bias the estimate of α p , but does increase its standard error. Our inclusion of a large set of stock return factors in the factor model reects our choice to be conservative in our assessment of risk-adjusted performance.
In Sections II-IV and Tables A6-A25 of the Internet Appendix, we demonstrate that our results from this and subsequent sections are robust when using alternative factor models.
Since T ERM and DEF are pure term and default factor mimicking portfolios, we orthogonalize each of ST OCKM KT , SM B, HM L, M OM , and LIQ with respect to T ERM and DEF prior to running the factor regression. This orthogonalization does not aect the estimate of α p or its statistical signicance, but it ensures that β T ERM P ost,p and β DEF P ost,p accurately measure the portfolio's post-formation exposures to term and default factor risk, respectively.
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Our hypothesis H1 predicts that the BBB− portfolio, as well as portfolios that are long BBB− bonds and short other IG bonds, should generate a positive alpha. The results of the portfolio analyses, shown in Table 4 29 Consistent with ratings measuring idiosyncratic but not systematic risk (Iannotta et al. (2018) ), the long-short portfolios have economically small and in most portfolios that are long (short) stocks with low (high) market capitalization, high (low) book-to-market ratio, high (low) momentum, and high (low) return sensitivity to aggregate liquidity, respectively.
28 Another ramication of orthogonalizing ST OCKM KT , SM B, HM L, M OM , and LIQ to T ERM and DEF is that the estimated coecients β T ERM P ost,p and β DEF P ost,p , and their inferential statistics, are exactly the same as those that would have resulted from estimating a two-factor model with T ERM and DEF as the factors, which is how we estimate the ex-ante values of β T ERM and β DEF (see equation (3)).
29 The nancial crisis of 2007-2009 was a period characterized by a large number of credit rating downgrades and substantial price volatility in xed-income markets. To ensure that our results are not driven by the events of this period, in Section V and Tables A26-A29 of the Internet Appendix we remove the nancial crisis period from our sample and repeat our main bond pricing tests. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
cases statistically insignicant post-formation risk factor exposure.
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We conduct several additional portfolio analyses to assess whether NIG proximity is behind the eect we document and whether a similar eect exists around the threshold between NAIC designations 1 and 2. Our rst two tests identify subsets of BBB− bonds that have higher NIG proximity than others and examine whether their outperformance is stronger. First, since for bonds rated by all three CRPs the middle of the three ratings is the one used for regulatory capital purposes, some bonds we classify as BBB− have an even worse rating from one of the CRPs. In Section VI.A and Table A30 of the Internet Appendix, we take these bonds to have even higher NIG proximity than other BBB− bonds and show that, consistent with our hypothesis, while outperformance is strong in both groups of BBB− bonds, it is stronger among BBB− bonds that are rated NIG by one CRP. Second, Lando and Skødeberg (2002) document momentum in bond ratings, suggesting that BBB− bonds recently downgraded from a better rating have higher NIG proximity than other BBB− bonds. In Section VI.B and Table A31 of the Internet Appendix we isolate recently downgraded BBB− bonds and show that, as expected, they have higher risk-adjusted returns than other BBB− bonds. Again, both groups of BBB− bonds outperform various subsets of other IG bonds. Since bonds rated BBB have the second highest NIG proximity, our third test examines the performance of long-short portfolios that are long bonds rated BBB and short better-rated bonds. Consistent with bonds rated BBB being closer to an NIG rating than better-rated bonds, albeit not nearly as close as BBB− bonds, Section VI.C and Table   A32 of the Internet Appendix show that these long-short portfolios generate positive but economically small and statistically weak risk-adjusted returns. Finally, since bonds rated A− are the worst-rated bonds with NAIC designation of 1, and any downgrade of these bonds would result in a slightly higher required capital charge, it is possible that insurers are also averse to owning bonds rated A−, and that this aversion aects prices. Tests of this hypothesis, shown in Section VI.D and Table A33 of the Internet Appendix, provide no evidence that bonds rated A− have dierential performance, consistent with the nding of Becker and Ivashina (2015) that the threshold between NAIC designation 1 and 2 does not aect insurers' purchases of newly issued bonds.
Systematic Risk Exposure and Bond Pricing
We turn now to testing our hypothesis H2 that IG bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure are overpriced (underpriced). We do so by examining whether bonds with high (low)
30 Nanda, Wu, and Zhou (2017) argue that rating-based capital requirements result in re sale risk being a priced factor. Interpreted in this light, our long-short portfolio returns may serve as empirical proxies for a re sale risk factor and the alpha generated by these portfolios as compensation for exposure to this factor. To rigorously test for dierential pricing between high-systematic and low-systematic risk bonds, we also calculate the excess returns for the zero-cost long-short portfolio that is long the decile 10 portfolio and short the decile one portfolio. Our hypothesis predicts that this long-short portfolio should generate a negative alpha.
Since our hypothesis H2 is conditional on capital charge, we repeat our tests using portfolios that are constructed to be capital charge-neutral. Specically, at the end of each month t, we rst separate bonds into two groups based on their NAIC designation and repeat the portfolio analysis within each group. We then calculate monthly excess returns in each systematic risk decile portfolio for the average NAIC designation group by averaging the excess returns of the given systematic risk decile portfolio (including the long-short portfolio) across the two NAIC designation groups, and examine the performance of these portfolios. We refer to these analyses as conditional portfolio analyses and the analyses that do not condition on NAIC designation, described in the previous paragraph, as unconditional analyses.
Bond Market Risk Exposure and Bond Pricing
Our rst tests of the relation between bond pricing and systematic risk exposure examine the performance of portfolios formed by sorting bonds on β CBM KT . The results of these tests are presented in Table 5 . The objective of sorting on β CBM KT , which is measured using data from the period prior to portfolio formation, is to generate a set of portfolios that have strong post-formation dispersion in bond market risk exposure. To ensure that our portfolios satisfy this criterion, we perform time-series regressions of each portfolio's excess returns on CBM KT .
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The slope coecients from these regressions, reported in the rows labeled β CBM KT P ost , demonstrate that our portfolio formation procedure works as intended. For the unconditional analyses, the post-formation exposures to CBM KT increase monotonically from 0.36 for the decile one portfolio to 1.65 for the decile 10 portfolio. The portfolio that 31 We estimate post-formation exposure to CBM KT using the one-factor model given by equation (2) because CBM KT is not one of the factors in the model we use to evaluate risk-adjusted performance (equation (4)). Since by construction CBM KT is a linear combination of T ERM and DEF , including CBM KT in equation (4) Most importantly, the results in Table 5 provide strong evidence that bonds with high (low) CBM KT exposure generate low (high) risk-adjusted returns, thus supporting our hypothesis that high-systematic (low-systematic) risk exposure bonds are overpriced (underpriced). Alphas, measured using the factor model given by equation (4) (4), demonstrate that the test design successfully 32 To conserve space, in the main paper we present only the estimates of α from the factor regressions.
Term Factor Exposure and Bond Pricing
The full set of estimated coecients for each portfolio are discussed in Section VII and shown in Table A34 of the Internet Appendix.
achieves its objective of producing portfolios with strong post-formation dispersion in term factor exposure. For both the unconditional and conditional portfolios, β 34 A potential explanation for this nding is that insurers have a strong preference for systematic term risk but not for systematic default risk because the premium for systematic term risk is larger than that for systematic default risk (see Table 2 ). Analysis of insurer holdings in Section 5.1.1 supports this conjecture.
Persistence of Pricing Eects
As discussed in Van Binsbergen and Opp (2017) , while the eects on the real economy of transient alpha generated by temporary price pressure are minimal, those of persistent alpha can be substantial. We therefore test whether the price patterns we detect are temporary or whether they reect a persistent equilibrium that diverges from the frictionless benchmark by examining the performance of the portfolios for a year after they are created. Specically, we repeat the analyses described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, except that now we analyze the performance of the portfolios k months after they are formed, for k ∈ {2, . . . , 12}. The results of these analyses, shown in Table 8 , demonstrate that the pricing eects we document are highly persistent. To save space, for rating-sorted portfolios, we only present results for the 33 To conserve space, in the main paper we present only the estimates of α and β
T ERM P ost
from the factor regressions. The full set of estimated coecients for each portfolio are discussed in Section VII and shown in Table A35 of the Internet Appendix.
34 To conserve space, in the main paper we present only the estimates of α and β DEF P ost from the factor regressions. The full set of estimated coecients for each portfolio are discussed in Section VII and shown in T ERM , the alphas of the decile 1 portfolio are all positive and signicant and those of the decile 10 portfolio and the long-short portfolios are all negative and signicant. The alphas of the β DEF portfolios are once again small and, in most cases, statistically insignicant. In addition to demonstrating that the pricing eects are highly persistent, the results in Table 8 address any concern that our ndings are driven by microstructure eects arising from forming portfolios at the end of month t and assessing their performance in month t + 1.
Drivers of Bond Pricing Eects
Having demonstrated support for our bond pricing hypotheses H1 and H2, we next investigate the drivers of the pricing patterns. We rst test our hypothesis H3 that the detected bond pricing patterns are attributable to insurer demand. We then turn to tests of our hypothesis H4 that the driver of insurer demand, and thus of the pricing patterns, is ratingbased capital requirements.
Insurer Demand and Bond Pricing
Our tests of H3 require data on insurers' corporate bond holdings, which we gather from 
Insurer Holdings
We rst examine whether insurers invest less in bonds with high NIG proximity and more (less) in bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure, consistent with incentives created by rating-based capital requirements. We do so using regression analysis similar in spirit to that in Fama and MacBeth (1973, FM hereafter 
where BBB− equals one if the bond is rated BBB− and zero otherwise, β j is either β CBM KT , β T ERM , or β DEF , and N AIC2 equals one for NAIC designation 2 bonds and zero otherwise. Table 9 reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression coecients, and t-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the time-series average equals zero.
The results provide strong evidence that insurers are averse to high NIG proximity bonds and have a preference for bonds with high systematic risk exposure, albeit not default factor risk exposure. In all three specications, the coecient on BBB− is negative and highly statistically signicant, ranging from −4.53 (t-statistic = −8.48) in specication (2) 
Insurer Holdings and Bond Performance
Having demonstrated that insurers strongly tilt their corporate bond portfolios away from bonds with high NIG proximity and towards bonds with high systematic risk exposure, bond characteristics that our hypotheses link to investment incentives created by ratingbased capital requirements, we next investigate whether insurers' demand for these bonds is the driver of the pricing patterns documented in Section 4. We do so by examining the relation between insurer holdings and risk-adjusted bond returns. While our hypothesis is that high (low) insurer demand causes high (low) bond prices and thus low (high) future risk-adjusted returns, our analysis is complicated by the possibility that insurer demand may also be a function of bond mispricing -insurers may be sophisticated investors who, in addition to the portfolio tilting that arises from incentives created by rating-based capital requirements, also overweight underpriced bonds. Such alpha-seeking behavior by insurers would suggest a positive, not a negative, relation between insurer holdings and future riskadjusted bond returns. Our empirical tests, therefore, must be designed to measure the relation between future risk-adjusted returns and the component of insurers' demand that is not driven by alpha-seeking behavior. We therefore examine the relation between insurer holdings and risk-adjusted returns of portfolios formed by sorting bonds on NIG proximity and systematic risk exposure. Specically, at the end of each month t we sort all NAIC designation 2 bonds into deciles based on an ascending ordering of β T ERM . We also separate the NAIC designation 2 bonds into those rated BBB− and those with any other rating.
The intersections of the 10 β T ERM groups and the two NIG proximity (BBB− and NAIC 2 No BBB−) groups form the 20 portfolios whose M V -weighted month t + 1 returns we examine. Since insurers have low (high) demand for bonds with high NIG proximity (high systematic risk exposure) and these bonds tend to generate high (low) risk-adjusted returns, it is unlikely that any relation between insurer holdings and bond performance across these portfolios is driven by alpha-seeking behavior. Indeed, alpha-seeking by insurers would only serve as a deterrent for insurers to exhibit the demand patterns we have documented, thus potentially weakening the power of our tests. We focus on NAIC designation 2 bonds because this allows us to hold capital charge constant and thus isolate the eect of NIG proximity, and we use β T ERM as our measure of systematic risk exposure because the results in Table 9 indicate that insurers' demand for high-systematic risk bonds is particularly strong for bonds with high term factor risk exposure. 35 In Section VIII and shown in column (1) of Table 11 , strongly support our hypothesis that the pricing patterns we document earlier in the paper are driven by insurer demand, since the coecient on the average portfolio-level %InsHeld is negative and highly statistically signicant. The adjusted R 2 value from the regression is 68.22%, indicating that most of the variation in portfolio alphas can be attributed to insurer demand.
Our second approach to examining the impact of insurer demand on corporate bond prices is to run an FM regression of monthly portfolio-level alphas on monthly portfolio-level %InsHeld for the 20 portfolios described earlier. We calculate the alpha for a portfolio in month t + 1 by taking the portfolio's month t + 1 excess return and subtracting from it the estimated factor sensitivities from factor model (4) times the corresponding factor excess returns in the same month. The result is a monthly time-series of alphas for each of our 20 portfolios. We then perform monthly cross-sectional regressions of month t + 1 portfolio alphas on month t portfolio-level %InsHeld. The time-series averages of the monthly crosssectional regression coecients, shown in column (2) of Table 11 , are consistent with the results of the single regression. The average coecient on %InsHeld is negative and highly signicant. The average adjusted R 2 value from these monthly cross-sectional regressions is lower than that of the single regression because the relation between %InsHeld and alphas is noisier in any given month than in the average month.
If the ultimate driver of the pricing patterns we document is, as we hypothesize, constraints arising from rating-based capital requirements, we expect that the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolios we examine is more closely related to the holdings of constrained insurers than the holdings of unconstrained insurers. To test whether this is the case, we repeat our analysis of the relation between insurer holdings and bond pricing using only holdings by constrained insurers, and then only holdings by unconstrained insurers. We dene a bond's %InsHeld Constrained to be the percentage of its par value held by constrained insurers, and a bond's %InsHeld U nconstrained as the dierence %InsHeld − %InsHeld Constrained .
Following Ellul et al. (2015), we identify constrained insurers as those with an RBC ratio in the bottom quartile of the sample for their type (life or property/casualty). Portfoliolevel %InsHeld Constrained and %InsHeld U nconstrained are then taken to be the M V -weighted averages of the corresponding bond-level values.
Since at the portfolio level %InsHeld Constrained and %InsHeld U nconstrained are highly correlated, to dierentiate between their eect on bond pricing we also construct their orthogonalized versions. Specically, we dene a bond's %InsHeld Constrained,⊥ to be the residual from a bond-level cross-sectional regression of %InsHeld Constrained on %InsHeld U nconstrained . Similarly, we dene a bond's %InsHeld U nconstrained,⊥ to be the residual from a bond-level cross-sectional regression of %InsHeld U nconstrained on %InsHeld Constrained . Portfolio-level %InsHeld Constrained,⊥ and %InsHeld U nconstrained,⊥ are calculated anologously to the other portfolio-level insurer holding measures.
Columns (3)- (10) of Table 11 present the results of the single and FM regressions of portfolio-level alphas on portfolio-level constrained and unconstrained insurer holdings.
While both %InsHeld Constrained (in columns (3) and (4)) and %InsHeld U nconstrained (in columns (5) and (6)) have a strong and highly signicant negative relation with alpha, the single-regression (FM-regression) coecient on %InsHeld Constrained of −0.048 (−0.041) is more than three times as large as the corresponding coecient on %InsHeld U nconstrained of −0.015 (−0.007). When both %InsHeld Constrained and %InsHeld U nconstrained,⊥ are included in the same regression, the coecient on %InsHeld Constrained is nearly unchanged while the coecient on %InsHeld U nconstrained,⊥ is statistically insignicant. Similarly, when %InsHeld Constrained,⊥ and %InsHeld U nconstrained are included in the same regression, the coecient on %InsHeld Constrained,⊥ is negative and highly statistically signicant, while the coecient on %InsHeld U nconstrained is insignicant. The results support the hypothesis that demand from constrained insurers is more strongly related to the pricing eects we document than demand from unconstrained insurers.
Insurers' Rating-Based Capital Requirements and Bond Pricing
Having attributed the bond pricing patterns to insurer demand, we turn to testing our last hypothesis H4 that the driver of insurer demand, and thus of the pricing patterns, is rating-based capital requirements. Although rating-based capital requirements for insurers are implemented in 1993, the resultant change in regulated rms' behavior may not have been instantaneous. Penalties for undercapitalized insurers under the new requirements were phased in over several years, and it may have taken insurers time to optimally react to the new regulations. Because the change in insurer demand was likely gradual, we do not expect to observe a structural break in 1993. However, we do expect that the patterns in insurer holdings and bond pricing are, on average, dierent in the period before than in the period after the implementation of rating-based capital requirements. Furthermore, if these requirements are indeed the driver of the eects we document, the patterns in insurer holdings and bond prices should not exist prior to the regulatory change.
Since insurer holdings data during and prior to the 1990s are unavailable, we are unable to investigate whether insurers' holdings are dierent in the period before compared to the period after the implementation of rating-based capital requirements. Instead, we test our hypothesis by examining whether the pricing patterns we attribute to insurer demand exist before the change in capital regulations. Specically, we repeat each of the asset pricing tests of Section 4 using portfolio formation months t (return months t + 1) To more rigorously test whether the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolios is dierent before compared to after rating-based capital requirements are implemented, we conduct a factor analysis of the full 1978-2014 time-series of portfolio excess returns but allow the alpha and factor exposures to dier after 1993. Specically, we augment our factor regressions with an indicator variable set to one for return months in 1993-2014 and to zero otherwise, and with this indicator's interaction with the factors. Table 12 presents the alphas from these regressions (complete results provided in Section IX and Table A42 of period (see Table 7 ) and insurers do not appear to have excess demand for bonds with large default factor exposure (see Table 9 ), we nd no evidence of a change in the pricing of the β DEF portfolios after the implementation of rating-based capital requirements. The results in Table 12 demonstrate that, on average, the performance of the portfolios we examine, except for the β DEF -sorted portfolios, is dierent during the period in which rating-based capital requirements are in eect than before they are implemented.
Alternative Drivers of the Pricing Eects
The results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provide strong evidence that demand by insurers, induced by rating-based capital requirements, is the driver of the bond pricing eects we document.
Here, we discuss whether demand by other market participants, i.e., banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and/or exchange traded funds (ETFs), may also play a role.
Similar to insurers, banks that are subject to rating-based capital charges that increase substantially for NIG bonds have an incentive to avoid bonds with high NIG proximity.
As discussed in Pennacchi (2006) and Iannotta et al. (2018) , when combined with liability guarantees (e.g., deposit insurance), these capital requirements also provide an incentive for banks to tilt their investment portfolios towards high-systematic risk bonds. However, for several reasons, it is unlikely that banks alone are responsible for the pricing eects we document. First, during 1993 First, during -2014 , banks hold only 6-16% of corporate bonds outstanding, compared to 29-38% for insurers (see Figure 1) . Therefore, investment demand from banks is likely to have less of an impact on corporate bond prices than demand from insurers. Credit ratings are also used in investment guidelines for pension funds, mutual funds, and ETFs (collectively asset managers). However, unlike insurers that incur the cost of higher capital charges if they retain bonds downgraded to NIG, asset managers face no strong incentive to sell such bonds and are rarely required to do so. A survey of 200 asset managers by Cantor, ap Gwilym, and Thomas (2007) nds that only 4% are required to take action if a bond is downgraded and no longer meets the fund's retention/eligibility requirements.
Thus, since asset managers have no strong aversion to purchasing bonds with high NIG proximity, the underpricing of these bonds is unlikely to be due to asset managers' demand.
Asset managers also have little incentive to tilt their portfolios towards bonds with high systematic risk exposure because, unlike insurers, they are typically evaluated on a risk- adjusted basis (Becker and Ivashina (2015) ). It is therefore unlikely that demand from asset managers drives the relative overpricing (underpricing) of high-systematic (low-systematic) risk exposure bonds. Finally, we are not aware of any regulatory or market change in or around 1993 that would have impacted the investment demand of asset managers in ways that would generate the pricing eects we document. This makes it dicult to reconcile the absence of the pricing eects during 1978-1992 with an explanation based on asset managers' investment guidelines.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that rating-based capital requirements, through their impact on investment demand, aect equilibrium market prices. Specically, we document two patterns in corporate bond prices and attribute them to demand induced by rating-based capital requirements. First, we demonstrate that IG bonds with high NIG proximity generate positive risk-adjusted returns, indicating that high-NIG proximity bonds are underpriced. Second, we show that bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure generate negative (positive) risk-adjusted returns, meaning that high-systematic (low-systematic) risk exposure bonds are overpriced (underpriced). These pricing patterns are persistent across a large cross-section and long time-series of more than 20,000 corporate bonds over the 1993-2014 time period.
We then attribute these patterns in bond prices to insurer demand and in turn to ratingbased capital requirements. Our results demonstrate that insurers do indeed invest proportionally less in high NIG proximity bonds and proportionally more (less) in bonds with high (low) systematic risk exposure. These patterns in insurer holdings explain most of the patterns in bond pricing. Finally, we tie the patterns in bond pricing to capital regulations by showing that the patterns do not exist prior to the implementation of rating-based capital requirements for insurers in 1993.
Our paper contributes to several important policy debates on the unintended conse- (2017)), the persistence of the pricing patterns we document suggests that the real economic consequences of these patterns can be considerable.
A second implication of our results is that by creating an incentive among insurers to invest in high-systematic risk exposure bonds, rating-based capital requirements may contribute to a buildup of systemic risk in the economy. The Financial Stability Oversight
Council has designated several insurers as systemically important nancial institutions in part because of a concern that their interconnectedness may pose a threat to nancial stability. Consistent with this concern, insurers' preference for the most systematically risky bonds makes their portfolio returns both highly correlated and highly sensitive to economic downturns. Furthermore, insurers' tendency to overinvest in high systematic risk borrowers may also contribute to the pro-cyclicality of real investment. Enhanced awareness of these eects of capital regulations on the real economy and systemic risk is particularly valuable to prudential regulators whose objective is to balance the benets of a safe and sound insurance industry against the costs of capital regulations' unintended consequences. This gure presents the average percentage of bonds, by regulatory rating, that are downgraded to NIG. A bond's regulatory rating is its credit rating for regulatory capital purposes.
For securities rated by multiple CRPs, the regulatory rating is the lower rating when two ratings are available and the second lowest rating when more than two ratings are available.
At the end of each month t, we group bonds according to their regulatory rating. For each group we calculate the percentage of bonds that are downgraded to an NIG rating at some point in months t + 1 through t + k, for k ∈ {1, 2, . . ., 12}. The gure shows the time-series averages of the percentages of bonds downgraded to NIG from each regulatory rating and for each value of k. Table 4 : Performance of Portfolios Sorted on NIG Proximity -1993 Proximity - -2014 This table presents the results of a portfolio analysis examining the performance of portfolios formed by sorting on NIG proximity. At the end of each month t, all bonds are sorted into ve portfolios based on whether they have (1) an NAIC designation of 1 (NAIC 1), (2) an NAIC designation of 2 but not a BBB− rating (NAIC 2 No BBB−), (3) an IG rating but not a BBB− rating (IG No BBB−), (4) a BBB rating (BBB), or (5) a BBB− rating (BBB−). We then calculate the market value-weighted month t + 1 excess return of each portfolio, as well as that of zero-cost long-short portfolios that are long the BBB− portfolio and short each of the other four portfolios. The row labeled Excess Return presents the time-series average of the monthly excess returns for each portfolio. The remainder of the -1978-1992 versus 1993-2014 This 
